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When does Europe matter? An analysis of pension reform policy in Spain and Italy 
  
Scholars interested in analyzing how the European Union affects domestic policy making argue that 
Europeanization occurs when domestic changes take place in response to a gamut of factors emanating 
from the EU, which not only include policy paradigms developed within the EU policy process but also 
concepts and ideas. In short, this perspective highlights the “indirect” or “cognitive” impact of the EU on 
member states’ policy decisions by helping to build some ideological consensus and stressing “the way 
things must be done.” The idea that there is more “Europe” in domestic policy makers’ discourse when 
justifying economic reforms is a powerful one; however, we still need to know what factors make such 
use of discourse more or least likely. I explore this issue by analyzing episodes of pension reform since 
the early 1990s in Spain and Italy, two countries that had relatively generous public pension systems and 
that since the 1990s have introduced different reforms. The comparative evidence from these two cases 
indicates that the use of a discourse aligned with the EU institutions’ view on pension policy was key to 
produce significant changes from the status quo when facing a political configuration characterized by a 
high number of veto players and a highly fragmented and deficit prone public pension system. 
 
Introduction: 
  Since the post-war period, most Continental European countries have structured their public 
pension systems following the traditional Bismarckian model, where benefits aim at replacing a high 
proportion of income before retirement and the system is funded according to the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
principle through which current employees pay for the benefits of current retirees. This system of a well 
extended earnings-related public pillar worked well in a period of sustained economic growth, low ratios 
of retirees to active workers and relatively low unemployment levels. However, since the late 1980s, 
longer life expectancies, declining birth ratios, early retirement waves, slowing growth rates and 
increasing funding deficit levels have been highlighted as a cause of concern for the sustainability of 
PAYG public pension systems by many analysts. The main problem pointed out by experts is that paying 
for generous pension benefits in a context of an ageing population will lead to unbearable public pension 
expenditures in the near future which will impact negatively on countries’ fiscal balances. Thus, how to 
reform PAYG public pension systems has become a central public policy issue for most European 
countries since the early 1990s.  2 
 
  Leading international organizations such as the World Bank (1994) and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development -OECD- (1988) have strongly recommended reducing the 
generosity of public pension pillars as a way to diminish future pension expenditures while promoting the 
development of second and third pillars of voluntary occupational and private pension plans to 
compensate for the less generous benefits paid by the reformed first pillar. In Europe, since the early 
1990s, the European Commission has expressed in different papers, communications and opinions the 
necessity to re-adapt public pension systems in order to make them more sustainable. In addition, during 
much of the 1990s European countries were forced to adopt sound fiscal policies in order to qualify for 
the final stages of the European and Monetary Union (EMU). In this context, it becomes interesting to 
analyze how the European Union has had an impact on the pension reform policy adopted by member 
states since the 1990s.  
  This paper aims to explore this question by looking at the cases of Spain and Italy, two good 
examples of countries with well extended Bismarckian public pension systems which, by the early 1990s, 
were in need of reform due to negative economic and demographic trends. Moreover, since the mid 1990s 
both countries have implemented significant, albeit different, reforms. The period in which the reforms 
have been implemented in these two countries coincided with a particular emphasis expressed by 
European institutions (mainly, the Commission) on how to deal with the reform of public pension systems 
together with the necessity, by EU member states, to comply with the final requirements to join the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1998. I therefore argue that comparison of Spanish and Italian 
pension reforms can provide useful insights to assess the influence that the EU has had on pension reform 
policy.  3 
 
  Pension reform within the European Union is largely the responsibility of member states as it 
falls outside the scope of EU laws such as Directives.
1 However, I argue that pension reform policy by 
member states can be affected by other actions that emanate from the EU level such as recommendations 
and papers on what constitutes pension policy best practice, which may have an impact on how domestic 
policy makers view and choose their reform options. In this sense, this analysis retakes the argument 
posed by some scholars who use the term “Europeanization” to describe how domestic public policies 
become more penetrated by concepts and general approaches to specific issues that are first developed at 
the European level.  
  I understand Europeanization as a phenomenon through which EU institutions can influence 
domestic public policies by changing the way policy makers approach to a specific issue and how they 
structure their discourse and policies. My focus is then on the ‘indirect’ and ‘cognitive’ aspect of 
Europeanization that highlights how the EU is able to affect policy paradigms, leading to change political 
actors’ discourse and perceptions of ‘how things must be done’ (Börzel and Risse 2000; Radaelli, 2003; 
Guillén and Alvarez 2004). The idea that there is more ‘Europe’ in policy makers’ discourse when 
pushing for reforms is an appealing one. However, in this research I aim to explore when such a discourse 
is more likely to be adopted to justify the need for significant pension policy reform. This research then 
follows that of other scholars (Schmidt 2002; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004), who explore when 
Europeanization discourse matters to understand public policy change.  
  I argue that policy makers’ discourse aligned with EU institutions’ views on pension policy may 
play a significant role when reformers face many political veto players and when the public pension 
system has been performing badly for a long time. The analysis of episodes of pension reform in Italy and 
                                                            
1 This is not to deny that EU directives have, however, some important regulatory impact in public and 
private pensions. Some examples of EU regulations related to pensions are the rule 1612/68 related to 
the supplementary pension rights for migrant workers, and the rule 1408/71 on social security rights for 
trans-border workers (Pochet, 2003). However, the main focus in this paper is on the reform of the main 
aspects of public pension systems such as the retirement age, benefit calculation, etc. This is an area 
that falls within the scope of member states and where EU influence can be largely indirect.  4 
 
Spain since the early 1990s seems to confirm this hypothesis. In Italy, after the collapse of the first 
republic in 1992 due to the “mani pulite” scandal, policy makers were faced with the necessity of 
reforming a public pension system that had been running significant deficits since the mid 1970s. In 
addition, due to their limited political support, governments had to justify the need to reform by 
employing a discourse that was quite aligned with EU’ institutions visions in this regard and that also 
pointed out the necessity to adopt reforms to qualify for the last stage of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU). By contrast, Spanish policy makers faced a public pension system that had run deficits only in 
recent years and, although the governments that pushed for reforms in the mid 1990s did not enjoy an 
absolute majority, the relatively low number of political veto players made negotiations easier. In this 
context, even though reforms were justified on the need to make the system more financially sustainable, 
policy makers did not have to rely on a discourse closely tied to ‘Europe’ when justifying the need to 
apply reforms to the public pension system. 
   In sum, the broader goal of this paper is to contribute to the scholar discussion of how the EU is 
having an effect on the “recalibration” of pension policy and of the welfare state in general (Ferrera 
2008). Moreover, by stressing the conditions under which ‘indirect’ or ‘cognitive’ influence from the EU 
plays a role to justify the reforms, as evidenced by policy makers’ discourse, I aim to shed some light on 
the issue of how Europeanization matters and helps to produce significant policy change. 
 
Europeanization, discourse and policy change: 
  The consolidation of the European project that gathered pace since the mid 1980s with the 
accession of the southern European states, the introduction of the Single European Act in 1987 and, more 
important, the adoption of the Maastricht treaty in 1992, which set a number of requirements for member 
states to move towards the final stages of the European Monetary Union (EMU), has sparked the interest 5 
 
of a number of scholars in analyzing how ‘Europe’ affects domestic policy making. This has led to the 
emergence of a growing literature on the “Europeanization” of public policies (Green Cowles et al. 2001; 
Börzel and Risse 2000; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003). While definitions of what exactly is understood 
as Europeanization abound, in general, there seems to be certain agreement among scholars that 
‘Europeanization’ takes place whenever we can identify the penetration of the ‘European’ dimension in 
national arenas of politics and policies (Börzel 1999). 
  The idea that there is more ‘Europe’ in domestic policymaking was pioneered by Ladrech (1994), 
who defined Europeanization as “an incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to 
the degree that EC political and economic dynamics becomes part of the organizational logic of national 
politics and policy-making” (Ladrech 1994, 69). This definition favors a rather “top down” effect of 
Europeanization according to which member states re-adapt domestic policies according to changes that 
take place first at the European level. This is also the approach favored by Green Cowles et al. (2001) 
who understand Europeanization as “the emergence and development at the European level of distinct 
structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political 
problem solving that formalize interactions among actors” (Green Cowles et al 2001, 3). 
  The definitions elaborated above tend to identify Europeanization with the specific way in which 
member states adopt EU law and they imply that “Europe” has a “direct” and “top-down” effect on 
domestic public policies. However, to capture the overall effect that the EU has on domestic public 
policies it is also necessary to think about the less direct influence that EU policy paradigms, preferences 
and, more broadly, general ways of understanding what constitutes good practice to address certain 
issues, has on domestic public policy choices. The rationale for such an approach is that when having to 
decide on certain policy areas where the EU may not have a direct responsibility, domestic policy makers 
may still look for some references at the EU level. This approach entails considering Europeanization as a 6 
 
much broader phenomenon than previously thought. In this approach, ‘Europe’ has a more indirect, yet 
not negligible, effect on domestic public policy making. 
  Radaelli (2003) has explored at length the “indirect” influence that the EU has on domestic public 
policies. His definition of Europeanization builds then on that elaborated by Ladrech’s (1994); however 
his definition aims at capturing how ‘Europe’ influences domestic public policies in a much broader way. 
In this sense, Radaelli argues that Europeanization refers to “processes of construction, diffusion and 
institutionalization of formal and informal rules, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and 
shared beliefs and norms which are first defined in the making of EU public policy and politics and then 
incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” 
(Radaelli 2003, 30). 
  Radaelli’s definition of Europeanization stresses then the “indirect” impact of the EU on domestic 
public policy because it understands that Europe may have an influence on domestic public policies even 
on areas in which the traditional legislative or community method does not apply (e.g. pension policy 
reform). The emphasis is then on the “ideological” impact of the EU on domestic policy makers 
preferences, a point also raised by Schmidt (2001; 2002). In this sense, Radaelli argues that his definition 
“does not mention EU laws or decisions of a similar level but ‘EU public policy’ because it includes 
modes of governance which are not targeted towards law making” (Radaelli 2003, 30). Following this 
approach, it is possible to argue that “modes of governance” refer to what the EU views as good policy 
paradigms, ways of approaching certain issues, even on areas which are mostly the responsibility of 
member states. Therefore, “indirect” Europeanization, as Radaelli and others understand it, takes place 
when member states’ policy makers adopt policies which are largely inspired in what the EU (namely, the 
Commission) understands as correct ways of approaching certain issues.  
  Radaelli’s definition of Europeanization as mostly an “indirect” phenomenon is related to what he 
calls “cognitive” Europeanization, understood as ‘the shaping and reshaping of the perceptions of and 7 
 
attitudes towards social problems and the way to tackle them’ (Radaelli, 2003). The role of “cognitive” 
Europeanization has also been explored by some scholars when analysing the EU influence on welfare 
state reforms (Guillén and Alvarez 2004). 
  In sum, it seems that when trying to understand how the EU impacts on areas such as pension 
reform adopting a ‘soft’ approach that looks at the indirect or cognitive influence of the EU on domestic 
policy makers’ decisions is the best way to proceed. Therefore, understanding Europeanization as an 
indirect phenomenon allows us to capture the domestic reverberations of EU preferences on domestic 
policy making (Radaelli 2003). 
   The focus of this paper is then on the indirect and “top-down” effect of Europeanization on 
domestic policy. While EU scholars have shown that Europeanization can also be understood as a 
“bottom-up” process by which domestic policy makers try to influence EU policies (Harcourt 2002) I 
argue that there is enough evidence to suggest that pension reform is a good example of  “top-down” 
indirect Europeanization. The EU (namely, the Commission) with its several recommendations, green, 
and white papers, may be able to exert a certain ideological or cognitive influence on policy makers in 
terms of the broad goals that pension reform policy should follow (favoring fairness and financial 
sustainability and not just coverage). Following the insights of some scholars (Schmidt 2002; Radaelli 
and Schmidt 2004) such influence may be evidenced in policy makers’ discourse strategy when justifying 
the need for reform. In this sense, I explore under which conditions policy makers are more likely to 
adopt a discourse closely aligned with EU institutions to justify the need for reform.  
  Scholars interested in analyzing how discourse matters for social policy change argue that a 
political configuration marked by many veto players that makes a significant deviation from the status 
quo difficult (following Tsebelis 2002) may lead policy makers to use a discourse focused on the need to 
comply with European rules and values more likely (Radaelli 2002; Schmidt 2002; Schmidt and Radaelli 
2004). I retake this insight but I add that, when analyzing the specific case of pension reform, the recent 8 
 
performance of the public pension system may also play a key role in explaining why policy makers rely 
on a discourse based on European rules and values when justifying the need for reform. Thus, it is when 
public pension systems have been mismanaged, running deficits and have developed serious inequities 
along time (in terms of many specific advantages for some cohorts) that policy makers can find more 
fruitful for successful reform to justify the need for it on grounds of complying with European views on 
this matter that make reference to the need to eliminate inequities, improve fairness and improve the 
financial sustainability of the system. In doing so, significant departures from the status quo may be 
possible. By contrast, in countries with a relatively moderate number of political veto players and where 
the public pension system has not been the subject of significant financial mismanagement and inequities, 
policy makers will not find useful to refer to European views on this matter when justifying the need for 
reform and the outcome will be a moderate departure from the status quo.  
  Comparative evidence from the cases of Italy and Spain seem to corroborate this approach. 
Before analyzing these two cases, I briefly describe the evolution of EU visions on pension policy. 
 
EU visions on pension policy: 
  Different studies have analyzed the evolution of EU visions on social policy (Liebfried and 
Pierson, 1995; Pochet 2005). In general, these studies point out that prior to the 1990s the focus of the 
then EC was on the harmonization of certain rules to ensure equal treatment across member states and the 
setting of minimum levels of coverage through the adoption of different EU directives. This included 
providing the possibility, for example, that workers could cumulate pension benefits acquired in different 
member states. In this sense, the EC view on social policy and on pensions in particular was more 
targeted at granting certain minimum standards across member states and to ensure good rates of 
coverage of social security systems. However, member states were considered to be the main actors in the 9 
 
design of social policy options and, as Liebfried and Pierson (1995) point out, until the early 1990s the 
definition of social policy guidelines and decisions were left to member states. 
  The economic recession of the early 1990s that led to high unemployment levels took place 
mostly at the same time that the European integration process was gathering pace with the negotiations 
and the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The decision to move towards the two final stages of 
EMU put emphasis on coordinating efforts in order to ensure that member states would be able to fulfill 
the different criteria to join the EMU. It was then agreed that the Commission would annually issue a 
recommendation for Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, which would be intended to coordinate the 
economic policy of the Member States and the Union. Since these early stages the performance of public 
pension systems was seen as a key aspect that affected public finances and therefore member states’ 
capacity to fulfill EMU criteria (Laitinen 2006). Within this context, already in 1992 the European 
Council issued a recommendation on the convergence of social protection objectives and policies where it 
made reference to the necessity of re-adapting public pension systems by discouraging early retirement 
and modernizing public pension systems taking into account new demographic and social behavior trends 
(European Council, 1992). 
  In 1993 the Delors Commission issued the White Paper on Growth Employment and 
Competitiveness where it set out a number of recommendations to promote job creation. In regards of 
pensions, the White Paper also stressed the necessity of re-adapting public pension systems by 
introducing innovative measures to account for demographic changes, reduce the burden that social 
security contributions represent for the hiring of low skilled workers and implementing other measures to 
“improve the financial situation of public pension systems (COM 93 700, 51).” 
  Also in 1993, while most European countries were being hardly hit by the economic recession, 
the European Commission published the Green Paper on Social Policy (COM 93 (553)), which warned 
about the necessity to re-adapt social policies to the new changing socio-economic scenario of high levels 10 
 
of unemployment that made necessary to adopt “a new look at the link between economic and social 
policies” (COM 93 (553), 6). In this sense, the Green Paper warned that the survival of public pension 
systems was at risk due to the combination of the economic slowdown with persistently negative 
demographic trends, which meant that more people would have to be supported by an ever shrinking 
workforce (COM 93 (553), 22). Therefore the Green Paper suggested that member states should think 
about the necessity to reduce the generosity of pension benefits, promote the expansion of private 
pensions via the tax system (although it warned that such a move would have a financial impact) and 
discourage early retirement (COM 93 (553), 22).  
 The  Green Paper was followed, in 1994, by the White Paper on Social Policy. This paper further 
stressed the need to improve the long term financial sustainability of public pension systems to ensure the 
maintenance of high coverage levels while recognising that specific solutions would be the responsibility 
of individual member states (COM 94 33, 36). In addition, this document put a particular emphasis on 
improving the fairness of social protection systems in general and of public pension ones in particular by 
ensuring that the more disadvantaged groups (e.g. women) were not discriminated due to career gaps 
(emphasis added). All these documents from the early 1990s stressed the necessity to engage in a 
consensus with social partners in order to implement the necessary reforms.  
  In sum, since the early 1990s the European Commission’ s view on the pension systems was that 
they were under financial stress due to economic and demographic factors and that this situation put more 
pressure on member states’ fiscal balances. Thus, if member states were to comply with the EMU 
convergence criterion of a government deficit of not more than 3% of GDP, some reform of the pension 
system would be necessary. Reforms would then have to be aimed at reducing the generosity of the 
system focusing on the equal treatment of different cohorts (especially women), promoting the 
development of occupational and private pensions, and discouraging early retirement.  11 
 
  In what follows, I analyze whether Italian and Spanish policy makers have adopted a discourse to 
justify the need for reform that can be seen as largely linked to the views of EU institutions on this matter, 
as explained above. The comparative evidence shows that facing a significant number of political veto 
players and a system that was on the brink of collapse, Italian policy makers significantly relied on a 
discourse strategy linked to ‘Europe’ and the goals set by EU institutions on pension policy in order to 
bring significant change to the system while this was not the case in Spain due to the moderate number of 
political veto players and to the comparatively better situation of the public pension system. 
 
Pension reform policy in Italy: 
  Since the early 20
th century, the Italian public pension system adopted a typical Bismarckian 
structure of differentiated schemes for occupational categories. However the main feature of the 
system was its use as a clientelistic tool by post-war governments in a context of increasing political 
participation and economic growth (Regini and Regonini 1981). In effect, since the 1950s, the 
dominant Christian Democratic party (DC) and, since the 1960s, the growing socialist party (PSI), 
engaged in providing pension provisions to specific cohorts (public employees, agricultural workers, 
etc) as a way of securing political support. As a consequence, during the 1950s and 1960s, specific 
schemes were created under the administration of the National Social Security Institute (Instituto 
Nazionale di Previdenza Sociale, INPS) for the selfemployed, agricultural workers, craftsmen, 
housewives and shopkeepers (Regini and Regonini 1981:222). As a general rule, pension benefits 
across the different schemes would be set at comparatively high levels compared to the contributions 
they received, an aspect that would lead to important deficit levels over time (Regini and Regonini 
1981:221). Another important characteristic of the system was the introduction of seniority pensions 
(pensioni d’anzianità) which allowed workers to retire on a full pension before the legal retirement 12 
 
age as long as they fulfilled a minimum number of contribution years (set at a low of 20 years for 
public employees). 
  The generous provisions to obtain a pension, initially granted to members of local and central 
government pension schemes, were further extended to all employees in the late 1960s, when after a 
series of labor protests, the labor confederations pressed the government for the extension of 
generous pension eligibility criteria to all the workers and the introduction of non-contributive 
pensions. The reforms of the late 1960s also included the automatic revaluation of benefits according 
to past CPI evolution, maximum replacement ratios of between 100% and 80% of last salaries, and 
the participation of labor confederations in the administration of the main institution in charge of 
administering the different funds, the INPS. The combination of very generous pension provisions in 
a society that would experiment significant demographic and labor market changes in the upcoming 
decades would put the Italian public pension system under increasing pressure. On the demographic 
side, statistics show that between 1950 and 1980 the fertility rate decreased from 2.5 to 1.7 children 
per woman while the old-age dependency ratio nearly doubled from 13% to 20%. On the socio-
economic side, unemployment rates would consistently increase since the 1970s and stay above 10% 
since the 1980s. As a consequence, government pension spending nearly doubled in the 1950-1980 
period (from 5.5% of GDP to 10%) and the system run consistent deficits since the 1970s. Table 1 






Table 1: Italy. Key economic, social security and demographic indicators  
  1950 1960 1965 1970 1980 1985 1990 1992 1995 
Fertility rate (Children 
per woman) 
2.5  2.4  2.7  2.4  1.7  1.4  1.33  1.3  1.17 
Old-Age Dependency 
Ratio (%) 
13 14 15 17 20 19 22 N/A  24 
Pension Spending (% of 
GDP) 
5.5  5 7 7.5  10  12.8  13.6  14.9  15.1 
INPS schemes balance 
(% of GDP) 
N/A N/A N/A N/A -1.17  -2.09  -2.64  -3.1 -3.4 
Unemployment Rate (% 
of working pop.) 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 7.60 10.30  11.00 11.40 12.10 
GDP  growth  (%)  N/A N/A 3.27 5.31 3.43 2.81 2.05 0.77 2.83 
Government Balance (% 
of GDP) 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  -8.4  -12.3 -11.4 -10.4 -7.4 
Source:  World Development Indicators (2002) and IMF World Economic Outlook Database. Social security data from 
  “Relazione generale sulla situazione economica.” Roma: Ministero del Bilancio, 1995. 
  
  The deficit of the public pension system contributed heavily to central government 
imbalances and, since the 1980s, the reform of the pension system would start to be viewed by some 
policy makers and societal actors as a necessary step to put public finances in order (Regini and 
Regonini 1981, 231; Lapadula and Patriarca 1995:78; Baccaro 2002). However, during the late 1970s 
and 1980s almost every single reform designed to reduce the generosity of the system was blocked 
due to the opposition of an “iron triangle” of members of the different political parties, managers of 
the INPS and various interest groups (Regonini 1995).  
  The early 1990s would then bring a set of important domestic and European level 
developments that would lead to significant domestic changes. At the domestic level, the 14 
 
repercussions of the major corruption scandal known as “Mani Pulite” would bring down the DC-PS 
government and a caretaker technocratic government was put in place in June 1992 led by former 
treasury minister Giuliano Amato.
2 On the economic side, 1992 would be a particularly difficult year 
for the Italian economy as economic growth plummeted while unemployment stayed above 11 
percent, a fact that would affect social security contributions. To make matters worse, in September 
the government was forced to take the Lira out of the European Monetary System, which led to a 
massive devaluation of the currency. Meanwhile, the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 
included a set of criteria regarding public finances (a budget deficit of less than 3% of GDP and a 
debt to GDP ratio of less than 60%) that would prove particularly daunting for Italy to achieve as 
government debt levels were above 100% and government budget deficit, to which the pension 
system contributed heavily, was at 10.4% of GDP. 
  The combination of the above developments together with an increasing focus by EU 
institutions on ensuring the long term financial sustainability of public pension system by applying 
some cost-containment measures would have a profound impact on how policy makers and societal 
actors would approach the reform of the pension system. Conscious of the pressing need to apply a 
significant reform to the pension system, whose deficit contributed heavily to the overall government 
deficit, but bearing in mind its weak political support, the caretaker Amato government would adopt 
a discourse strategy that would point out the necessity to reform the system to put public finances in 
order, much in the same way as EU institutions suggested.  
                                                            
2 As some observers point out, Amato, together with former central bankers like Carlo Azeglio 
Ciampi and Lamberto Dini, was part of the group of technocrats that since the 1980s were convinced 
about the necessity of implementing major reforms in Italy’s public finances sector, of which the 
pension system was an important component (Natali 2004,Radaelli 2002). This group of technocrats 
would also be firm supporters of stringent EMU convergence criteria as they saw them as an 
opportunity to commit the country to put its finances in order (Dyson and Featherstone 1999; Sbragia 
2001). 15 
 
  This new focus of policy makers and societal actors’ discourse about putting the finances of 
the public pension system under control by applying some cost containment measures was evident 
since 1992. Earlier that year, labor movement pension expert Guiliano Cazzola warned that a major 
reform of the system “was necessary and could not wait” and that a future reform should include an 
increase in the years considered to calculate a pension and an increase of the retirement age (La 
Stampa 31
st March 1992). In a similar vein, in his inaugural speech, Prime Minister Amato explained 
that “a major reform of Italy’s public finances, while painful, is necessary and it will have the 
pension system as a central component” (La Stampa, July 1st 1992). In sum, policy makers’ and 
societal actors’ discourse during this time would center around the “risanamento” or the necessity to 
“restore the health” of public finances, in which the public pension system played a key role (Ferrera 
and Gualmini 2004:58;; Natali 2004). Thus, evidence of an “indirect” or “cognitive” Europeanization 
of pension reform policy can be found in the Italian case as different key actors would start to 
structure their discourses and actions around the necessity to approach the pension problem in a 
different way, focusing on re-organizing the system and, more important, reducing the many 
different privileges for specific schemes in order to make the system fairer. 
  The Amato government would then elaborate a reform seeking input from the labor 
movement. During the negotiations, the labor confederations obtained some concessions regarding 
the elimination of an increase in the number of years required to get a seniority pension and the 
calculation of benefits according to the salaries of the entire working career only for new entrants to 
the system (La Stampa, October 14
th, 1992). The reform was significant in that it helped to contain 
spending levels by raising the minimum contribution years for obtaining a seniority pension to 35 
years and setting the number of years required to get a pension at 20. As an outcome of the reform, 
private voluntary pension plans were authorized in 1993 through a special decree law. 16 
 
  The Amato reform, although important, did not help to reduce spending levels significantly, 
and in 1994 a new reform was deemed necessary. After a failed attempt to introduce new changes 
during the Berlusconi government, which attempted to advance reform without consulting with the 
unions and justifying its need only on technical grounds, a new caretaker government was appointed 
led by the former treasury minister Lamberto Dini (Baccaro 1999; Natali 2004).  
  Dini’s approach to pension reform would be similar to that of Amato and while seeking 
collaboration from labor and pensioners he would stress the necessity of passing the reform to save 
the system from bankruptcy and improving the fairness of the system. In the same vein, labor and 
pensioner leaders also presented the reform as a “mal minore” (minor evil) to improve the financial 
sustainability of the system and save it from bankruptcy.
3 The reform would significantly change the 
structure of the system, introducing a new formula for the calculation of benefits based on a worker’s 
full contribution history and not in the last salary levels prior to retirement.
4 The new system would 
imply a significant reduction in the replacement rate of the system, therefore the main concessions 
given to the labor and pensioner movement centered upon which cohorts would be affected by the 
new system (Rhodes and Natali 2006; Jessoula and Alti 2006). In effect, after negotiations with 
them, it was agreed that the system would totally apply only to new entrants and that workers with at 
least 18 years of contributions would retire according to the rules of the old system. Those with less 
than 18 years of contributions would have their pensions calculated on a pro-rata basis: until 1995 
according to the old system and after 1996 according to the new one.   
  In November 1997, the Prodi government, desperately pressed to qualify for EMU, agreed 
yet another reform that would reduce the budget deficit by 0.2%. The reform included a gradual raise 
                                                            
3 Personal interviews with CGIL’s main pension experts, Rome-Brussels, 2006. 
4 The system is called “National Defined Contribution” because even though current contributions are still 
used to pay current retirees, workers’ contributions are registered in virtual or “notional” accounts. The 
registered contributions are indexed every year and the total accumulated is used at the retirement 
moment to calculate annual pension benefits (adjusted by life expectancy). See Börsch-Supan (2003). 17 
 
in the minimum years to obtain seniority pensions (35) and in the retirement age (57) for all workers. 
During this time, public officials’ discourse would center again on the necessity to eliminate the 
unfairness of the system, restore the health of public finances, and most important, allow Italy to 
qualify for the last stage of EMU (Featherstone 2004). At the start of the negotiations, the governor 
of the Bank of Italy expressed that: “…the reform of the pension system is urgent and it is key for the 
‘risanamento’ of public finances and for joining the euro (emphasis added). Only the introduction of 
certain elements will provide certainty to the public and the markets that the system is financially 
sustainable” (La Stampa 25
th July 1997). The focus of the reform in reducing the unfair aspects of the 
system was also highlighted by the main leaded of the CGIL confederation, Sergio Cofferati: “for the 
first time, everyone will be treated the same way” (La Stampa 4
th November 1997).  
  In sum, it can be argued that during the 1990s there was an increasing “indirect” or 
“cognitive” Europeanization of pension policy as policy makers and societal actors structured their 
discourse and actions quite in line with the EU priority for pensions of reducing costs, eliminate 
unfair aspects, and ensure the long term financial sustainability of the system. Why did Italian policy 
makers use this type of discourse to bring significant change? The first reason had to do with the 
institutional-political configuration given by caretaker governments facing an important number of 
parties that they had to negotiate with (which was also the case of the elected 1997 Prodi 
government).
5 The second connected reason was the critical situation of the system, which had been 
running deficits since the 1970s, was highly fragmented and had numerous provisions for different 
cohorts and for early retirement. In this situation, a discourse that focused on the ‘risanamento’ of 
public finances, on the equal treatment of different cohorts and even on the necessity of passing the 
                                                            
5 The number of parties supporting the Amato government were four, while the number of parties 
supporting the Dini government were at least five. The number of parties supporting the Prodi 
government were eight. See Ferrera and Jessoula 2007, page 413. 18 
 
reforms to help Italy qualify for the last stage of EMU, would prove particularly fruitful to produce a 
significant departure from the status quo. 
  By contrast, the reform attempt of the Berlusconi government in 1994 showed that even 
when having support from their own parties, the lack of a successful discourse strategy related to 
‘Europe’ and grounded only on technical issues, made that attempt unsuccessful and eventually led to 
the resignation of government in late 1994. The 2004 and 2007 reforms passed by the Berlusconi and 
the Prodi governments also focused on specific issues such as the development of supplementary 
private schemes and increasing the effective retirement age. Although these reforms were passed 
thanks to the support in Parliament (in the case of the Berlusconi government) and the consultation 
with social partners (in the case of the reform pushed by the Prodi government) they were not 
justified on the necessity to comply with EU institutions’ view on pension policy. Not surprisingly, 
these reforms did not entail significant changes to the structure of the system and observers doubt 
about their real impact.
6 
  The Italian case illustrates the argument advanced in this paper that when confronting a 
political scenario in which there are many political veto players and the public pension system is 
characterized by significant imbalances and ‘unfair’ aspects that are contrary to EU institutions’ view 
on pension policy, a discourse strategy that focuses on ‘Europe’ and on reducing the ‘inequities’ of 
the public pension system may prove particularly effective to achieve a significant departure from the 
status quo. When such a discourse strategy is absent, reforms attempts may fail or only entail very 
limited change. My analysis of the Spanish case will give further support to my argument as in the 
absence of a system with significant imbalances and in a situation characterized by a reduced number 
of veto players, a discourse focused on ‘Europe’ to justify the need for reform did not take place in 
                                                            
6 See Eironline 04/03/2008. 19 
 
the Spanish case. Thus, successive reforms since the 1990s have entailed a modest departure from the 
status quo. 
 
Pension reform in Spain: 
  The main characteristic of the Spanish public pension system was its late organization when 
compared to those in other Western European countries. Even though the origins of the system can be 
traced back to the early 1900s with the introduction of special regimes for public servants and some 
voluntary insurance schemes for some other occupational categories, the basic structure of the Spanish 
pension system as it is now known was laid out in the 1960s and 1970s with two important reform 
laws.
7 This legislation created a system with a general scheme (Regimen General), which covered 
around 70% of workers and a number of special schemes (Regimenes Especiales) for public 
employees and other occupational categories.
8 Thus, by the mid 1970s the Spanish public pension 
system had a typical Bismarckian structure with pay-as-you-go (PAYG) funding, fragmented in 
different schemes that granted differentiated pension benefits, and paying defined benefit (DB) 
pensions that were calculated according to the last two years of contributions. However, by the end 
of Francisco Franco’s dictatorship Spain still lagged behind other Western European countries in 
terms of pension and overall social protection spending and coverage. In fact, statistics show that 
while the EC social protection expenditure average was at 23 percent of GDP in 1975, that figure for 
Spain was only 12.1 percent (FOESSA1983:813). Coverage of the pension system was also seen as 
                                                            
7 These were the 1963 Basic Law of Social Security (Ley de Bases de la Seguridad Social) and the 1972 
Funding and Improvement Law (Ley de Financiamiento y Perfeccionamiento). 
8 Among others, the law stablished special regimes for: rail workers, miners, agricultural workers, 
maritime workers, self-employed, civil servants, employees of Franco’s National Movement, provincial 
employees, cooperative workers, domestic service, students, retail workers, civil employees of the armed 
forces (MTAS 2005, 15). 20 
 
weak and even by 1978 35 percent of the population did not have access to any type of pension 
benefit (Panizo Robles 1993:255). 
  The democratization process that started in 1975 put a special emphasis on expanding social 
protection as policy makers and the general public alike understood that now that Spain had achieved 
almost European levels of development and was to become a candidate to join the EC, it had also to 
attain European levels of social protection (Guillén and Alvarez 2004). The 1978 Constitution 
incorporated this general concern for more social protection and granted universal extension of social 
protection coverage to all citizens (articles 41, 43 and 49). Consequently, from 1978 until the election 
of the first socialist government in 1982, a series of measures were implemented that led to a 
significant expansion of pension coverage between 1978 and 1983 (Cruz Roche et al 1985:200; 
Guillén 1999:10).  
  As a consequence of the expansive measures of the late 1970s and early 1980s the coverage 
of the system increased significantly, as well as total expenditure levels, which jumped from 5% of 
GDP in 1980 to 8.3% in 1982. However, by 1982 still 14.4% of workers were excluded from 
receiving any social security benefit (FOESA 1983:811). 
  In 1982, the newly elected Socialist government, which increasingly embraced a neoliberal 
approach of economic adjustment and restrictive monetary policy to achieve macro-economic 
stabilization, applied a series of measures to try to rein on pension spending. The most important of 
these measures was the 1985 pension reform law, which was passed after failed negotiations with the 
labor confederations. The main goal of the law was to reduce fraud levels, especially on disability 
pensions and to eliminate pensions given under unclear arrangements (Guillén 1999, 9; MTAS 2001, 
26).  The law introduced important changes in the parameters of the system: fifteen years of 
contributions required to obtain a pension (previously ten); benefits calculated using the last 8 years 21 
 
of salaries instead of the last two; stricter controls to get disability and survivorship pensions; 
benefits adjusted according to the estimated (and not the past) CPI increase. In 1987, the government 
passed another crucial law, taking advantage of its comfortable parliamentary majority and the 
weakness of the labor movement, which allowed workers to subscribe private pension plans (Chuliá 
2007, 530). 
  The 1985 law certainly helped to contain expenditure in the public pension system, which 
would stay at around 8.4% until the late 1980s. By that time, a better economic outlook and the 
government’s necessity to accede to the demands of the labor movement, which organized a 
successful general strike on 14
th December 1988 against a proposed labor flexibility initiative, led the 
socialist government to implement measures to increase social spending and expand the coverage of 
the pension system. After negotiations with the labor movement, it was decided to index pensions to 
past CPI increase and non-contributory pensions were introduced in 1990. These would be the last 
series of measures targeted at expanding the generosity and coverage of the pension system.  
  In sum, the evolution of the Spanish pension system until the early 1990s shows some 
significant differences with the Italian case that would play a role in the upcoming reform process of 
the 1990s and 2000s. First, as described above, in the 1980s policy makers were able to introduce 
some significant cost containment measures, most notably the 1985 pension reform law that 
tightened eligibility criteria and reduced the number of pension schemes. Second, even though 
pension expenditure continued to increase, the system would run a deficit only in the mid 1990s. This 
is significantly different from Italy where the public pension system was running deficits since the 
mid 1970s. In fact, the shared view of pension experts and negotiators is that the reforms of the 22 
 
1980s helped to “save” the system from a certain collapse.
9 Third, on the political side, even though 
the governments that would have to implement reforms in the mid 1990s would not count with an 
absolute legislative majority, they were able to form a stable coalition with the Catalan nationalist 
party Convergencia i Unió. Facing a situation in which the public pension system was not running 
deficits for a long time and in which there was a moderate number of political veto players, Spanish 
policy makers would stress the necessity to introduce limited reforms to the system in order to ensure 
its financial sustainability. Thus, their discourse would not focus so much on the ‘inequities’ of the 
system, the necessity to ‘restore public finances’ and even on ‘doing the reforms to be able to join the 
last stage of EMU as we saw in the Italian case. Rather, their discourse strategy would point the 
necessity to adopt some cost-containment reforms to ensure the financial sustainability of the system 
but without suggesting a radical change to the structure of the system.  
  The recession of the early 1990s in combination with some negative demographic trends 
would signal the necessity to advance some reforms. A combination of declining growth rates since 
1991 plus negative labor market and demographic tendencies were reducing surplus levels in the 
public pension system. In effect, throughout the 1980s Spain underwent important demographic 
changes with a reduction of the fertility rate from 2.6 children per woman in 1980 to 1.3 in 1993 
while the proportion of old to young people (the old-age dependency ratio) increased from 18% in 
1980 to 22% in 1993. In addition, the unemployment rate, which is a critical factor in a system that 
heavily depends on workers’ contributions for its sustainability, stayed above 15% during the 1980s 
and peaked at 23% in 1993. Table 2 summarizes these data. 
 
                                                            
9 Personal interviews with social security chief of staff and with pension negotiators from the two main 
trade union confederations. Madrid 2006. 23 
 
Table 2: Spain. Key economic, social security and demographic indicators  
  1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1991 1993 1995 
Spending in 
Contributive Pensions 
(% of GDP) 
5.7 8.0 8.5 8.5 8.4 8.7 9.0 9.9 9.7 
Social Security Balance 
(% of GDP) 
3.5 2.0 1.1 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 -0.1 
Old-Age Dependency 
Ratio (%) 
18.4 n/a  18.9 18.9 19  21  21.4 22  23.3 
Fertility Rate (Children 
per woman) 
2.6  1.94 1.72 1.6  1.42 1.33 1.31 1.32 1.27 
Unemployment Rate  
(% of economically 
active population) 
12.4 16.6 21.1 20.6 18.3 16.1 17.0 23.8 22.5 
GDP Growth (% 
change) 
21  1.54 1.5  3.2  5.16 3.74 2.27 -1.16  2.4 
Government Balance (% 
of GDP) 
-1.8 -5.3 -5.1 -5.7 -3.1 -3.6 -4.2 -6.6 -4.5 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (www.ine.es) and Sainz de Baranda (2001) 
  During the 1993 electoral campaign, the conservative candidate José M. Aznar (Partido 
Popular – PP) highlighted the necessity to adopt reforms to secure its long-term financial 
sustainability although he did not specify what type of reform he would support. While the Prime 
Minister Felipe González (PSOE) criticized Aznar’s attitude of questioning the soundness of the 
system he was not clear about whether the system would need to be reformed or not (El País June 6
th 
1993).  
  In November 1993, the labor minister José Antonio Griñán expressed that “the current public 
pension system needed reforms to ensure its financial sustainability” (El País November 4
th, 1993). 
The general belief that some cost-containment reform was needed to ensure the sustainability of the 24 
 
system was expressed by the Prime Minister in March 1994 when he stated that “the public pension 
system would have to be revised in light of the current labor market and demographic changes” (El 
Mundo  February 23
rd 1994). The idea that “something had to be done” to ensure the financial 
sustainability of the system was also shared by some experts within the ministry of social affairs (El 
Mundo September 13
th 1994) and also from the labor movement and the main center-right opposition 
party.
10  
  In February 1994, a parliamentary commission was appointed to assess the changes needed to 
the system. After a year of work the commission concluded that the sustainability of the system 
would be reinforced if some cost-containment measures were adopted. All the parties represented in 
parliament signed an agreement, the so called Toledo Pact, which recommended specific changes: 
reducing the specific privileges for some schemes and gradually reduce them to only two; an increase 
in the proportionality between contributions and pensions; the financing of non-contributive pensions 
through taxes and not with workers’ contributions (these should be reserved to finance only 
contributive pensions); the progressive retardation of the retirement age; the use of tax incentives to 
promote voluntary private pensions; the improvement of widows and survivors’ pensions.
11  
  The positions of Spanish policy makers during the negotiations that led to the Toledo Pact, 
followed policy makers concerns expressed since early 1993 and they permanently stressed the 
necessity to find ways to ensure the long term financial sustainability of the system by reinforcing its 
solidarity aspect reducing special provisions and the number of different schemes. However, policy 
makers’ discourse never made reference to the necessity to significantly change the system in order 
                                                            
10 The position of the two main labor confederations was, however, of combating evasion rather than 
reducing the generosity of the system (Personal Interviews with negotiators from Unión General de 
Trabajadores-UGT and Comisiones Obreras-CCOO, Madrid 2006). The position of the main center-right 
opposition party (Partido Popular) was also that cost-containment reforms were necessary and feasible 
(Personal interview with main PP pension policy negotiator, Madrid 2006). 
11 The recommendations of the Toledo Pact can be consulted at the Social Affairs and Labor Ministry’s 
website http://www.tt.mtas.es/periodico/documentos/Recomen%20Pacto%20Toledo.htm. 25 
 
to comply with EU institutions’ view on pension policy. As social security officials from the PSOE 
government note: “there was certain division within the PSOE party in terms of the extent of the 
measures that were needed to implement, but all the sectors agreed that a complete overhaul of the 
system was not necessary.”
12 This position was also shared by members of the main opposition force, 
the Popular Party (PP): “we were well aware of the magnitude of the reforms needed but instead of 
favoring a major overhaul we just focused on supporting measures to ensure the sustainability of the 
system.”
13 In fact, the text of the Toledo Pact explicitly excludes the possibility of changes the 
structure of the system of PAYG funding and inter-generational solidarity and it makes numerous 
references to maintaining the “just, balanced and ‘solidarity’ aspect” of the system.  
  As it is possible to appreciate, the positions expressed by the different political actors since 
1993 regarding what to do with the pension system and the agreement finally reached in 1995 with 
the Toledo Pact did not point towards the necessity to radically change the system in order to comply 
with ‘Europe’ or to join EMU, as in Italy. Rather, policy makers’ positions just focused on how to 
improve the financial sustainability of the current system by taking into account more years in the 
calculation of a pension, encouraging the development of supplementary private schemes and trying 
to improve the coverage of some less advantaged cohorts (i.e.: widows and orphans).  
  The negotiations to implement the recommendations of the Toledo Pact would be led by the 
newly-elected government from the Partido Popular (PP), which came to power in 1996 thanks to an 
alliance with the Catalan nationalist party Convergencia i Unió and the nationalist Basque and 
Canarian parties (PNV and CC respectively). The government would negotiate the implementation of 
the Pact with the labor movement, represented by the two main trade union confederations 
Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) and Union General de Trabajadores (UGT). As some experts observe, 
                                                            
12 Personal Interview with former Social Affairs Chief of Staff from the PSOE government (Madrid, 2006)  
13 Personal interview with main PP pension policy negotiator, Madrid 2006 26 
 
since taking office, the new PP government was eager to show its compromise with maintaining the 
public pension system, a point on which the socialists had heavily campaigned to gain votes from 
older voters in the 1993 elections (Chuliá 2007). In the negotiations the government and the social 
partners would then agree on some cost containment measures (gradual increase in the number of 
years used to calculate the pension benefit from 8 to 15 years; penalization of early retirement; 
reduction in the number of occupational schemes; annual adjustment according to wages’ evolution) 
in exchange for other measures that tended to improve the situation of the less advantaged (an 
amelioration of the lowest widows’ and orphans’ pensions; no penalization for early retirement if this 
was due to long unemployment; raise of the age limit to receive orphan survivorship pensions). 
  In more recent reform episodes the government and the social partners have stressed the 
necessity to implement some adjustments to improve the financial sustainability of the system. 
However, in each reform the labor movement has obtained concessions in light with its goals of 
aiming at representing the interests of all workers and benefiting the less advantaged. For example in 
the negotiations of 2001 and 2006 cost containment measures regarding the minimum number of 
years to receive a pension (set at 15) and the separation of funding sources for contributive and non-
contributive pensions were agreed in exchange for other measures such as an increase in widows and 
orphans survivorship pensions and in the pensions for those who retire after 66 years old to promote 
late retirement (El Mundo 31
st May, 2006). 
  In all the reforms that have been negotiated since 1995, Spanish policy makers’ discourse has 
just focused on the necessity to maintain and secure the financial sustainability of the public pension 
system but, unlike in Italy, such discourse is not explicitly linked to the necessity to comply with 
‘Europe’ or with the goals pushed by EU institutions. Following the theoretical approach advanced in 
this paper, I contend that the better performance of the Spanish system together with a political 27 
 
configuration characterized by a moderate number of political veto players, when compared to the 
Italian case, has not made necessary for Spanish policy makers to rely on such a discourse strategy. 
The better situation of the public pension system (which has been running surpluses since the late 
1990s) and the reduced number of political veto players with which the main government party had 
to negotiate reforms (illustrated by the absolute majority of the 2000-04 PP government and the 
almost absolute majority of the 2002-08 PSOE government) explain why the 2001 and 2006 reforms 
entailed very moderated cost-containment reforms and actually improved the benefits for some 
cohorts. 
    While we could certainly agree on the fact that some of the cost-containment measures 
pushed forward since the mid 1990s in Spain do not contradict the views of EU institutions, the 
comparative evidence reveals that ‘Europe’ and the values promoted by EU institutions on pension 
policy have not been used to bring significant policy change in Spain. Thus, “indirect” or “cognitive” 
Europeanization of pension policy, as evidenced by policy makers’ discourse strategy, has been 
much less relevant in Spain than in Italy.  
 
Conclusion: 
  This paper has analyzed and compared pension reform policy in Spain and Italy since the 1990s, 
with a particular focus on the role played by the influence of the European Union in such process. By 
analyzing these two cases, I have tried to contribute to the ongoing scholar debate of how the EU is 
affecting the reform and “recalibration” of pension systems and, more broadly, welfare states (Ferrera 
2008). Moreover, I have tried to explore the causes under which policy makers are more likely to justify 
the need for reform by employing a discourse strategy that is linked to EU institutions visions on pension 28 
 
policy to bring significant policy change, thus offering evidence of “indirect” or “cognitive” 
Europeanization.   
  I theorized that the performance of the public pension system and the political configuration 
determined by the number of political veto players whose agreement is necessary for policy change 
may explain why governments in some countries are more likely to justify significant pension reform 
using a discourse strategy linked to complying with EU values and norms. The analysis of the Italian 
and Spanish cases shows that a discourse strategy that justified the need for significant reform with 
‘Europe’ and even with the need to qualify for the last stage of EMU was much more important in 
Italy than in Spain. 
  In Italy, the public pension system had been running deficits since the 1970s and was 
characterized by numerous provisions that granted generous benefits with relatively few years of 
contributions. The political and economic crisis of the early 1990s signaled the need to perform a 
significant reform of the system if Italy wanted to put its public finances in order to qualify for the 
last stage of EMU. Confronting a fragmented political configuration and a public pension system that 
was on the brink of collapse, Italian policy makers adopted a discourse strategy that identified the 
significant reform of the system with the need to comply with ‘Europe’ and even being able to join 
the last stage of EMU, as pointed out during the 1997 reform. 
  In Spain, the public pension system had a deficit only in the mid 1990s and during the 1980s 
some important cost-containment reforms were adopted to tighten eligibility criteria, to reduce the 
generosity of the system and to avoid the provision of pension benefits under unclear circumstances. 
In the early 1990s, when the recession and negative demographic trends indicated the need for 
reforms, policy makers would favor some cost containment measures but they explicitly ruled out a 
significant change in the structure of the system. Thus, their discourse strategy focused on the need to 29 
 
ensure the long-term financial sustainability of the system but not on the need to reform it to comply 
with EU views on this matter or even with the need to qualify for EMU. The comparatively better 
situation of the Spanish public pension system and a political configuration given by a moderately 
low number of political veto players explains why there was no necessity to justify the need for 
significant reform by relying on ‘Europe’. The outcome of the reforms since the 1990s has been very 
incremental and the structure of the system has not been significantly changed. 
  The entry of Italy in the last stage of EMU in 1998 means that justifying further significant 
reforms with the necessity to comply with ‘Europe’ is no longer an option. Not surprisingly, recent 
reforms in 2004 and 2007 have not had a significant impact. In Spain, the comparatively good 
performance of the system until recent years has also meant that the recent reforms have not had a 
significant impact in the structure of the system. 
  However, as the impact of the global economic downturn affects these economies and the 
performance of their public pension systems, we may wonder whether there will be a renewed 
interest in applying significant cost-containment reforms. In this scenario, if policy makers face a 
political configuration in which the agreement of an important number of political veto players is 
needed, a discourse strategy justifying the need for reform with EU institutions’ views on this subject 
may prove useful to produce significant change.   
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